


~~SECRET~~*weird
reading**file ACDA*NIO #1574/76
5 October 1976*GB
Mael - 10-10-76*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Howard StoertzSUBJECT ✓ : ACDA-Proposed NSSM on "Verification of Arms Control
Options in the 1980's"*AN IMPORTANT STUDY BEGINS
THAT WILL CARRY OVER INTO THE
NEXT ADMINISTRATION.*

1. In December 1974, shortly after the Ford-Brezhnev meeting on SALT at Vladivostok, ACDA informally proposed an intelligence study on "SALT in the 1985 Time Period in the Light of Verification Problems." In a follow-up letter to the DCI and others in April 1975, Dr. Ikle broadened the proposal to include verification of arms limitations generally and asked specifically for a survey of planned and possible verification assets.

✓ 2. During the period from the inception of this proposal through 1975 and early 1976, the DCI, the NIO/SP, and other CIA managers had a number of exchanges with ACDA officials about it, both by memorandum and face-to-face. The intelligence officials stressed two points:

✓ a. In a study of arms limitation possibilities in the 1980's, the determinant of candidate limitations should not be programmed or possible intelligence capabilities, but should be options or strategies for arms control which the policy-making community considered to be potentially in the US interest. To start with intelligence capabilities would have the tail wagging the dog. It would result in a scatter-gun survey of all strategic intelligence capabilities. It would not sufficiently involve the policy agencies.

✓ b. The timing of the proposed study was premature in light of the status of SALT II and the other commitments which were absorbing the high-quality analytical resources of the intelligence community which would be required. A SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok accord was expected, first in the spring and then the fall of 1975, then possibly in the spring of 1976. The competent analysts were heavily

ACDA~~SECRET~~

SECRET

engaged in many priority projects, including among other things analyzing our capabilities to monitor SALT II and MBFR agreements and supporting Delegations in Geneva and Vienna.

✓ 3. CIA nevertheless supported ACDA's idea in principle. Mr. Bush affirmed his personal support of it in a meeting with Dr. Ikle in April 1976. Before and after that meeting, with much advice and drafting assistance from NIO/SP and others, ACDA refined its proposal into a draft NSSM with three basic parts:

✓ -- first, identification of candidate arms control options and their verification requirements;

✓ -- second, assessment of verification assets and capabilities relevant to these requirements;

✓ -- third, evaluation of the candidate options in the light of verification capabilities.

In proposing its NSSM, ACDA added proliferation to its list of arms control issues to be studied. It called for completion of the ~~proliferation part of the study in 6 months and the rest of the study in a year.~~ Dr. Ikle sent the NSSM proposal to the NSC Staff on 1 July 1976. A copy is attached.

✓ 4. The DCI concurred in Ikle's proposal after adjusting the wording to make it clear that an intelligence working group under the chairmanship of a DCI representative would do the second part. Both CIA and OSD joined in causing a sentence to be inserted in Ikle's memo to the NSC Staff, warning that the most competent analytical personnel were already heavily engaged.

✓ 5. In response to Ikle's proposal, John Markham of the NSC Staff called a meeting on Monday, 4 October, to start the ball rolling on an interagency study of the sort Ikle had proposed. [redacted] and Howie Stoertz attended for CIA, Fred Eimer and Paul Wolfowitz for ACDA. State/INR was represented, but the DoD was not. At Markham's request, the discussion did not focus on the form the study would take (my impression is that the NSC Staff is not prepared to ask the President to lay on a NSSM), nor on its priority in terms

25X1A

SECRET

SECRET

of intelligence resource commitments. Markham's view was that it was now desirable to prepare for an anticipated post-election review of arms control policy, and that this was a good way to start.

6. At Monday's meeting, it was tentatively agreed that:

✓ a. any such study should focus on mid-term future problems (i.e., not immediate SALT II, MBFR, or proliferation problems, but also not so far in the future as to be beyond existing intelligence planning and estimating);

✓ b. There should be some focus on areas of potential arms limitation not heretofore the subject of negotiation (e.g., naval limitations, "gray-area" systems);

✓ c. terms of reference should be drafted by ACDA and discussed in about a week by a group comprising NSC Staff, State, ACDA, OSD, JSC, and DCI representatives;

d. Terms of reference should include proposed method and timing and a proposed list of candidate arms limitation options.

✓ 7. In my view, Markham's approach generally meets the CIA concern to be sure that the policy agencies determine the candidate arms limitation options against which intelligence should measure its capabilities. It remains to be seen whether the policy agencies can agree on a manageable list, and whether the timing can be negotiated so as to avoid major conflict in the commitment of intelligence resources, especially in view of such ongoing priority tasks as NIE 11-3/8-76 and the NSSM on overall US defense policy.

25X1A



NIO/SP

Attachment

SECRET

5 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : ACDA-Proposed NSSM on "Verification of Arms Control
Options in the 1980's"

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - Exec.Reg.
- 1 - IC Staff/ [] DCI's PFIAB briefing book)
- 1 - IC Staff []
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - D/DCI/NI
- 1 - Chairman, JAEIC
- 1 - NIO/CF
- 2 - NIO/SP
- 1 - NIO/RI

NIO/SP/ []